Article 1 of the Family Code of the Philippines
Article
1.
Marriage is a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law
for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidences are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within
the limits provided by this code. (52a)
Concept of Marriage.
As a status, it is the civil status of one man and one woman legally united for life, with rights and duties which for the establishment of families and multiplication and education of the species are, or from time to time, may thereafter be assigned by law to matrimony. (Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and Separation, Sec. 11).
As an act, it is an act by which a man and a woman unite for life, with the intent to discharge towards society and one another those duties which result from the relation of husband and wife. (Schoule, Law of Dom. Rels., par. 11).
Marriage is not like an ordinary contract, that if there is no performance of one's duties, an ordinary contract can be the subject of rescission; in marriage, there is no such rescission.
Marriage is a permanent union. The parties cannot fix a period for its efficacy to be ineffective after a few years, especially so that its nature, consequences and incidents are not subject to stipulations of the parties - for they are governed by law. Its permanent character has been taken from the well-accepted rule that, "WHAT GOD HAS PUT TOGETHER, NO MAN SHALL PUT ASUNDER."
Mail-Order Bride:
To emphasize the importance of marriage as a social institution and a relationship, Congress enacted RA 6955 penalizing any person, natural or judicial, association, club or any entity who may commit any of the following acts:
1. To establish or carry on a business which has for marriage to foreign nationals either on a mail-order basis or through personal introduction;
2. To advertise, publish, print or distribute or cause the advertisement, publication, printing or distribution of any brochure, flier, or any propaganda material calculated to promote the prohibited acts in the preceding paragraph;
3. To solicit, enlist or in any manner attract or induce any Filipino women to become a member in a club or association whose objective is to match women for marriage to foreign nationals whether on a mail-order basis or through personal introduction;
4. To use the postal service to promote the prohibited acts in subparagraph 1. (Republic Act. 6955, Section 2, June 13, 1990).
Presumption of marriage for man and woman deporting themselves to be married:
In Maria del Rosario Mariategui, et. al., vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 57062, January 24, 1992, it appeared that Lupo Mariategui contracted 3 marriages. With his first wife, he begot four children; second wife, a daughter; third wife, three children. At the time of his death, he left properties which he acquired when still unmarried. On December 2, 1967, the children in the first and second marriages executed an extrajudicial partition over Lot 163. A title was later on issued under names.
On April 23, 1973, the children in the third marriage filed a complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 and Lots Nos. 669, 1343 and 154 were owned by their father, hence, the adjudication of Lot No. 163 in favor of the other heirs deprived them of their share. They prayed for partition. The defendants moved for dismissal contending that the complaint was one of recognition of natural children. It was denied. On February 16, 1977, the complaint and counterclaim were dismissed.
On appeal, the CA declared all the children and descendants of Lupo as ENTITLED TO EQUAL SHARES. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but it was denied, hence, this petition.
The case of Leonica and Gaudioso Balogbog vs. CA, et. al., G.R. No. 83598, March 7, 1997, 80 SCAD 229, is a mere reiteration of the rule on presumption of marriage although there was a failure to present the marriage certificate. But there were testimonies to show that a marriage was celebrated. It has been held that evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses can be competent to prove the marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is primary evidence, the failure to present it is not proof that marriage did not take place.
An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the witness who states that the wedding took place, since the purpose of having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment. (U.S vs. Memoracion, 34 Phil 633; People vs. Borronmeo, 133 SCRA 106).
How marriage may be proven:
Marriage may be proven by the marriage certificate which is the best evidence.
Presumption of marriage:
Marriage can be proven by evidence aliunde, that despite the fact that the marriage certificate cannot be presented which is the best evidence of the same, yet, it can be shown by testimonies of the sponsors, by the public and the fact that there was baptism of children, to mention some among the many proofs of marriage. The solemnizing officer can even brought to the court to testify that in fact, he solemnized the marriage of the spouses.
Characteristics of marriage:
The Supreme Court said that marriage is not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment
CASE:
Santos vs., CA, et. al.,
G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 58 SCAD 17
FACTS:
Plaintiff Leouel Santos married defendant Julia Bedia on September 20, 1986. On May 18, 1988, Julia left for the U.S. She did not communicate with Leouel and did not return to the country. In 1991, Leouel filed with the RTC of Negros Oriental, a complaint for voiding of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC dismissed the complaint and the CA affirmed the dismissal.
ISSUE:
Does the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years constitute psychological incapacity?
HELD:
No, the failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with her husband Leouel for more than five years does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by:
a) gravity
b) juridical antecedence, and
c) incurability
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem
Petition is denied.
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